Sofema Online (SOL) Looks at the EASA – ICAO Annex 1 Divergence issues.

Adopted in 1986, Resolution A26-9 was a landmark decision that officially recognized that nearly 75% of aviation accidents are caused by human performance issues rather than mechanical failure.

• Objective: To improve safety by making States more aware of the importance of Human Factors (HF) through the provision of practical materials and training.

• Medical Link: It shifted the view of "Medical Provisions" from merely checking for physical illness to a broader assessment of Human Performance and Limitations (HPL), including fatigue, stress, and cognitive workload.

• Outcome: This led to the creation of the ICAO Human Factors Digests and eventually the inclusion of HF requirements in Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) and Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft).

EASA vs. ICAO: Medical Provisions

EASA’s medical requirements (Part-MED) are generally compliant with ICAO Annex 1, but they are often more prescriptive to ensure a high, uniform level of safety across all EU Member States. Consider the following Real-World Divergences:

Color Vision

ICAO  - Requires "safe" color perception but allows various testing methods.

EASA (Part-MED) - Uses a strict hierarchy (Ishihara, then CAD test or Lanterns) with specific pass/fail criteria.

Mental Health

ICAO  - General standards regarding absence of "psychological disorders."

EASA (Part-MED) - Requires mandatory mental health screenings and "Peer Support Programs" (post-Germanwings Flight 9525).

Medication

ICAO  - Broadly prohibits drugs that interfere with safety.

EASA (Part-MED) - Provides a specific "Permitted Medication List" and mandatory "fit to fly" waiting periods after certain drugs.

Divergent Licensing Formats & Non-Compliances

A "Non-ICAO Compliant" license occurs when a State issues a license that does not meet the minimum age, experience, or medical standards of ICAO Annex 1. 

Such licenses are usually limited to the issuing State’s domestic airspace.

Example A: The U.S. FAA "Basic Med" (Non-Compliance)

The FAA introduced Basic Med, which allows certain pilots to fly without a standard ICAO Medical Certificate, using a state driver's license and a checklist instead.

• Non-Compliance: It does not meet the ICAO Class 2 medical standards.

• Result: Pilots flying under Basic Med cannot fly into EASA territory (or most other ICAO states) without specific bilateral agreements, as the license is considered "Non-ICAO Compliant" for international transit.

Example B: Age Limits (Annex 1, 2.1.10)

ICAO Standards state that for multi-pilot commercial operations, a pilot can fly until age 65, provided the other pilot is under 60.

• Divergence: Some countries (e.g., France in the past or certain Asian states) have had lower mandatory retirement ages (e.g., 60). While this is "more restrictive" (which ICAO allows), it creates a divergent licensing environment where a 63-year-old EASA pilot can fly into a country but cannot be employed by an airline within that country.

Example C: Divergent License Format (Physical vs. Digital)

ICAO Annex 1, Appendix 1, specifies the exact data fields and layout for a license (e.g., Roman numerals I-XIV).

• Real-world issue: If a State issues a "Digital-only" license without a physical ICAO-standard backup, it is technically non-compliant with the current Annex 1 requirement for a physical document. This often requires the State to file a "Notification of Difference" with ICAO.

Why Divergence Matters (Article 38)

Under the Chicago Convention, if a State (or EASA on behalf of its members) cannot comply with an ICAO Standard, they must file a Notification of Difference under Article 38.

Example: If EASA implements a new fatigue management rule that is stricter than ICAO Annex 6, they notify ICAO. While this is "non-compliant" with the exact wording of the SARP, it is accepted because it exceeds the safety baseline.

Germanwings Flight 9525

The 2015 accident is the most significant modern example of how a failure in Medical Provisions can trigger a fundamental shift in Human Factors regulation.

• In this case, a co-pilot with a history of severe depression and suicidal thoughts  intentionally crashed the aircraft. The investigation by the French BEA and the subsequent EASA Task Force revealed systemic gaps in how mental health was reported and monitored globally.

The Conflict: Medical Confidentiality vs. Public Safety

A primary finding was that the co-pilot had been seen by multiple doctors who diagnosed "possible psychosis" and issued sick leave certificates days before the crash. However, none of this was reported to the airline or the aviation authority due to strict German medical privacy laws.

EASA's Regulatory Response (The "Germanwings" Rules)

Following the accident, EASA introduced Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/1042, which added specific requirements to the "AIR OPS" (Air Operations) and "Part-MED" (Medical) frameworks that significantly exceed the ICAO baseline:

• Mandatory Psychological Assessment: All pilots must undergo a psychological assessment before commencing line flying with an airline.

• Pilot Peer Support Programs (PSPs): Operators are required to provide access to a non-punitive support system where pilots can seek help for mental health issues without fear of immediate, permanent license loss.

• Drug & Alcohol (D&A) Testing: Introduced mandatory random alcohol testing for flight and cabin crew, as well as testing upon employment and after serious incidents.

• European Aeromedical Repository: A centralized database was created to prevent "AME-shopping," where a pilot might fail a medical in one country and try to obtain one in another.

• Real-World Divergences and ICAO Non-Compliances

The Germanwings incident highlighted that ICAO Annex 1 was too broad regarding mental health. This led to specific divergences between EASA and other global authorities.

 

1. Divergence in Mental Health Reporting (Article 38 Differences)

Medical Secrecy

ICAO Annex 1- Generally silent on the conflict between privacy and reporting.

EASA / EU Approach - Encourages "Safety over Privacy"; requires doctors to report "fitness-for-duty" concerns to authorities regardless of patient consent.

Peer Support

ICAO Annex 1 - Recommended as a best practice but not a standard.

EASA / EU Approach - Legally Mandatory for all European commercial operators.

Psychological Assessment

ICAO Annex 1 – Not explicitly required for initial medical certification.

EASA / EU Approach - Now a mandatory component of the Initial Class 1 Medical and pre-employment.

1. Non-Compliance Example: The "Two-Person Rule"

Immediately after the accident, EASA issued a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) recommending that two authorized persons (usually a pilot and a cabin crew member) remain in the cockpit at all times.

• The Divergence: Some non-EASA states (and eventually some European airlines) later removed this requirement, citing new Human Factors risks—specifically, the increased risk of a cabin crew member inadvertently interfering with controls or being used as a pawn in a hijacking.

• Compliance Status: Because ICAO Annex 6 does not mandate the "two-person rule," countries that removed it are technically ICAO-compliant, while EASA’s stricter SIB created a temporary divergent operating procedure.

Human Factors Link (Resolution A26-9)

The Germanwings case updated the application of Resolution A26-9 from "preventing errors" to "managing mental incapacitation."

• Pre-2015: HF training focused on Cockpit Resource Management (CRM)—how pilots talk to each other to solve technical problems.

• Post-2015: HF training now includes "Mental Resilience" and "Peer Monitoring." Pilots are trained to recognize signs of psychological distress in their colleagues, moving the medical provision into the actual cockpit environment.

Summary of Differences

The EASA response to Germanwings represents a move toward a "High-Prescriptive" model of medical oversight, whereas many other ICAO Member States still follow a "Self-Disclosure" model.

A pilot with an EASA license is subject to more frequent psychological scrutiny and systematic drug testing than a pilot under many other ICAO jurisdictions. While this makes the EASA license "more robust," it creates a technical difference (under Article 38) that other States must recognize when EASA pilots operate in their airspace.

Next Steps

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